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I WANT TO DISCUSS not the sons of TIP but what  is perhaps  a grandson 
toward  which the TIP family  is developing.  It is a wage-increase  permit 
plan (WIPP), about  which  I have  written  briefly  in Challenge  and  Social 
Research.1  Although I consider  WIPP more logical, manageable,  and 
effective  than  any  of the TIPs, I said  in those articles  that  I would  support 
some folm of TIP that seemed  more likely to be acceptable  and imple- 
mented.  But the discussion  at this conference  has convinced  me that the 
objections  to the various  TIPs are much more serious than I had sup- 
posed, that most of them would not apply  to WIPP, and that it is not at 
all clear that a TIP would indeed  be more likely to be accepted.  I have 
also been thinking  more about  WIPP, developing  it further,  and becom- 
ing more  fond  of it, so I want  to restate  it. 
WIPP is based on a view of the economy such as that suggested  by 
Perry.  In my view, inflation  in the United States  is not caused  by excess 
demand,  but by self-fulfilling  expectations,  with prices rising  at about 6 
percent  to keep up with the cost of production,  compensation  rising at 
about  9 percent  to keep up with the cost of living  and increasing  produc- 
tivity,  while the government  keeps increasing  total spending  in the econ- 
omy to prevent  catastrophic  unemployment.  There is a vicious circle of 
rising  prices,  rising  wages,  and  rising  total spending  in which  none  of these 
can stop because  the others  are going on. And yet there  is a new kind of 
fairly  stable,  process  equilibrium-a 6 percent  expectational  inflation. 
1. "Stagflation-Its  Cause and Cure," Challenge, vol.  20  (September/October 
1977), pp. 14-19; and "From Pre-Keynes  to Post-Keynes,"  Social Research, vol. 47 
(Fall 1977). 
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This condition  of the economy is the result of a flaw in the market 
mechanism.  Important  lessons are to be learned  from the natural  history 
of another  faw. During  World  War  HI  there arose a "shortage"  of some 
essential  items that led to intolerable  price  increases.  The poor were de- 
prived  of vital  necessities  that  the rich  were  using  wastefully. 
The natural history begins vith price control. That leads to black 
markets  and to arbitrary  and discriminatory  informal  rationing  by shop- 
keepers.  The informal  rationing  is then  replaced  by official  formal  ration- 
ing. This is still considered  bothersome  and wasteful  and is greatly  im- 
proved by point rationing,  under which the same ration points can be 
used  for several  substitutes.  Next there  are  ration  points  that are  valid  for 
wider ranges of goods and reduce illegal trading  of rations and ration 
tickets.  The final stage  would take the form of Michal Kalecki's  general 
rationing.  This rationing  uses a single set of points expressed  in money, 
which essentially  serves only as permits  to limiit  the amount  of money 
any individual  can spend  on the "scarce"  essential  commodities. 
As the scarcity  abated  after  the war, the prices  of the scarce  items  fell 
so low that the allotted permits (which had drawn  large black market 
prices) almost  made possible the purchase  of more than people wanted 
to buy.  These  permits  would  have  become  redundant  and  quite  worthless, 
but the entire  system  was scrapped  before  this happened,  which  provided 
a more  dramatic  (if somewhat  synthetic)  occasionl  for celebrating  decon- 
trol. 
TIP is a similar  development  of procedures  (although  not completed) 
for correcting  a flaw in the market  mechanism,  and most of the objec- 
tions  to TIP raised  at this conference  owe their  validity  only to the incom- 
pleteness  of the correction  of the flaw.  The flaw  in the present  instance  is 
a mutation  of the flaw  responsible  for the great  depression  of the 1930s. 
That  flaw  was diagnosed  by Keynes  and  its cure  prescribed  in 1936 in 
the more elementary chapters of  The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest  and  Money.  It was the failure  of wages  to fall far enough  and  fast 
enough  in response  to a deficiency  in demand  for labor  to maintain  a satis- 
factory  level of output  and  employment,  given  the level of total spending. 
The  cure  was easy  because  of the availability  of a free  variable-increases 
in the level of spending.  This could be adjusted  to take the place of the 
decrease  in wages  and prices  that  was missing.  It was costless  because  of 
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national  debt,  and the unlimited  scope for costless  increases  in the quan- 
tity  of money. 
The  mutation  is that  wages  do not merely  refuse  to fall but  keep rising, 
caught  in a self-fulfilling  expectational  inflation.  Government  and busi- 
nesses,  which seem to have an incurable  propensity  to treat inflation  as 
if it were due to too much total spending,  hold down their spending  as 
long as prices  are  rising,  but  desist  from  this  when  the  resulting  unemploy- 
ment  threatens  to reach  double  digits.  This is what  creates  stagflation  but 
does  not  lead  to catastrophic  depression. 
The simple  Keynesian  remedy  is not effective  in dealing  with  this muta- 
tion.  The task  is now twofold:  it is necessary  to stabilize  the average  price 
(the price level), with average  wages rising at the national  average  rate 
of productivity  increase;  and to adjust  relative  wages and relative  prices 
to the continuing  changes  in tastes and techniques.  To accomplish  this 
task  the vicious  circle of rising  wages,  prices,  and total spending  must  be 
broken.  Stopping  any one of them could break  the spell in which each 
has to keep  rising  because  the others  are  rising.  But stopping  the spending, 
which  the government  could  bring  about,  only  works  through  catastrophic 
depression and severe unemployment.  Alternatively,  prices or wages 
could be stabilized.  Prices, however,  are much more complicated  than 
wages,  and  price  regulation  is more  easily  evaded  by quality  changes.  The 
best option seems  to be to stabilize  wages, which are already  largely  ad- 
ministered  by collective  bargaining  and other  large-scale  wage decisions. 
In the 1940s I developed  some rules for wage regulation  to achieve 
the twofold objective  and published  them in my Economics  of Employ- 
ment  in 1951. Later  this was attempted  in practice  by wage-price  guide- 
lines and guideposts,  which included  price regulation  for political pur- 
poses. The first  objective  was achieved  with some success  by a freeze of 
prices  and wages,  but it was soon eroded  by the regulations  for adjusting 
relative  wages  and  prices. 
These regulations  became  an administrative  nightmare  parallel  to the 
use of price controls against the intolerable  price increases  caused by 
scarcities  in World War II. The administrators  were unable to handle 
the complexities  or deal with the resistances.  The bureaucratic,  adminis- 
trative  decision  mechanism  broke  down.  The task  required  local decisions 
by local people  who knew  the local conditions;  thus,  something  more  like 
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Tax-Based  Incomes  Policy 
A great  step forward  was made by Weintraub  and Wallich  in propos- 
ing such a device in their tax-based  incomes policy (TIP).  Weintraub 
used the analogy  to laws against  speeding,  laws that people can break  if 
they  are  prepared  to pay the fine.  The analogy  is faulty  because  a speeding 
law that succeeded  in keeping  everyone  below the speed limit would be 
regarded  as successful.  What  is needed  is a rule-if  you could call it that 
which  would  normally  and properly  be broken  half the time. 
To fulfill  the twofold  task of keeping  the average  price constant  while 
leaving  individual  prices free, average  wages must continue  rising at a 
norm equal to the national  average  rate of productivity  increase  while 
leaving  individual  wage rates  free. For this it is necessary  to discourage 
the granting  of wage  increases  (or to provide  an incentive  to resist  wage 
increases) in a way that will still permit  some wage increases  to exceed 
the norm  by as much  as other  wage  increases  fail to reach  the norm. 
If TIP were adjusted  to eliminate  all subsidies  and to provide  equal 
tax incentives  at all levels for equal reductions  in the amounts  of wage 
increase,  with no lower or upper limit (no minimum  threshold  and no 
maximum  of any kind), it would  solve the incentive  problem  efficiently.2 
(These are indeed the adjustments  I suggested  in proposing  to support 
TIP rather  than WIPP in my Challenge  article;  the second condition, 
equal  tax incentives,  is similar  to adjustments  suggested  by Seidman.)  But 
TIP would still be left with much of the "litigation  nightmare"  of un- 
limited  disputes  about the appropriateness  or the equity of the charges 
and  the subsidies  in different  situations,  because  it does not solve  the prob- 
lem of deciding  how strong  to make the tax incentive.  It would correct 
only  part  of the  flaw. 
TIP would mobilize the essential function of  price  in the market 
2.  Subsidies are proposed only because of a confusion between the necessity of 
offsetting  the effects of taxes on total spending and the desirability of ameliorating 
hardships.  Hardships  apply to people, rather  than businesses,  and their amelioration 
calls for income benefits, not changes in prices or wages. Similarly, the word "pen- 
alty" is unfortunate  because it suggests a punishment  imposed for wrongdoing. TIP 
would impose something like a price, which, as always, discourages people from 
buying something because they would rather keep the money for other purposes. It 
is not a punishment  for any improprieties.  This does not rule out the grants or tax 
reductions required to increase total demand in order to offset the effect of  the 
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mechanism,  which  is to discourage  whatever  activity  calls for a price to 
be paid  and,  its mirror  image,  to encourage  whatever  enables  a price  to be 
received.  Still missing  would  be the other  half of the market  mechanism, 
the guide to free decisions  in the social interest  by the establishment  of 
price at the level that equates supply and demand.  WIPP, unlike TIP, 
uses the market  mechanism  to provide  this guide  and  to adjust  the incen- 
tive  to the  strength  required. 
Wage-Increase  Permit  Plan 
WIPP  works  as  follows: 
(1)  The government  would grant "wage  increase  permits"  to every 
employer  who qualified  by employing  more  than,  say, 100 workers  or any 
workers  whose  wages  were  fixed  by an agreement  that  covered  more  than 
100 workers-for instance,  one permit  for each $1,000 of the employer's 
total costs of employment  (called his "wage  bill,"  but including  all fringe 
benefits  and so forth).3 Records  would be kept of the employer's  wage 
bill from a base date, including  each employee's  wages (pay plus the 
employee's  share  of the  other  costs  of employment).4 
(2)  Newly hired employees,  including all employees of new firms, 
would enable  their qualified  employers  to obtain additional  permits  and 
also a permit  for each $1,000 of the new employee's  wages.  Conversely, 
on the separation  of an employee  from  a firm,  including  all the employees 
of a firm that closes, the corresponding  number  of permits  would have 
to be returned  to the permit  authority.  This would adjust  the total num- 
ber of permits  to changes  in the wage bill that were due to changes  in 
employment,  rather  than  to changes  in the  wage  level.5 
3.  "It is now uniformly recognized that payments to common benefit trust funds 
providing pension welfare, vacation and vocation training and other benefits repre- 
sent  a substantial  economic  portion  of  employee  wages  .  .  .  ." (Statenmenzts  and Re- 
ports Adopted by the AFL-CIO Executive Council, Bal Harbour, Florida, February 
20-27, 1978, pp. 57-58). 
4.  Some components of these data are required  by the Internal Revenue Service 
or by the Social Security Administration, with which the permit authority would 
cooperate. The firm could allocate its total fringe benefits among the employees in 
any way it chose as long as the total cost of all the fringe benefits was included in 
the wage bill. 
5.  Care would have to be taken to prevent  evasion by firing  and rehiring  at higher 
pay (to obtain free permits for an "employment  increase"  instead of buying permits 
for what is really a wage increase) and to avoid related collusions between firms and 
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(3)  Each permit  would give the employer  who held it the right (by 
raising  wage  rates) to raise  his adjusted  wage  bill by, say, $30 per permit 
(3 percent  of the face value  of his permits,  which  is the estimated  national 
average  rate of increase  in output  per employee-"productivity"). 
(4)  The permits  would be freely tradable  in a perfectly  competitive 
market,  like a share of IBM in the stock exchange.  Any employer  who 
wished  to increase  his adjusted  wage  bill by more  than 3 percent  by rais- 
ing wage  rates  would  have  to acquire  more  permits.  He could  obtain  them 
only through  purchase  from others who had to reduce the increase  in 
their  wage  bill by the same amount  below 3 percent.  Any employer  who 
reduced  his wage bill would qualify  for a grant  of additional  permits  for 
the corresponding  amount (one permit  for each $30 cut from a wage 
bill), and could sell those permits.  The national  total wage bill would 
thereby  always  be raised  just 3 percent  a year by the wage bill increases 
of the different  firms.  Because the wage bill is adjusted  for changes in 
employment  at the level of the firm  and at the national  level, the national 
average  wage  would  continue  to rise at 3 percent  a year.  The price  of the 
permit  would be set by the market  at the level at which supply equals 
demand;  this price would just offset inflationary  expectations  for raising 
wages  more  than  productivity. 
A year later each 100 old permits  would be replaced  by 103 new, 
dated,  $1,000 permits.  The total number  of permits  at the national  level 
would  therefore  keep up with  both components  of the national  total wage 
bill: the volume of employment  and the national  average  wage. 
WIPP  would  thus  indeed  "whip  inflation  now"  by achieving  the essen- 
tial twofold  objective.  It would  keep the average  wage rising  at the same 
rate  as output  per  worker,  eliminating  price-level  inflation,  and  leave each 
particular  wage  free  for determination  by individual  or collective  bargain- 
ing. All other prices would be left for free market  determination  estab- 
lished before WIPP was introduced.  The money paid or received for 
permits  would then be just one more of the many considerations  that 
influence  wage  settlements. 
A Comparison  of the  Two  Proposed  Policies 
Wage  bargaining-both individual  and collective-could proceed  as it 
did  before  the adoption  of an anti-inflation  policy, and  the same  would  be 
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other  market  imperfections,  such as restrictive  practices,  monopoly,  mo- 
nopsony,  cartels,  and oligopolies.  It does not prevent  monopsonistic  ex- 
ploitation of workers in company towns or keep strong unions from 
forcing employers  to grant exorbitant  wage increases.  And it does not 
stop unions from persuading  the government  to put pressure  on em- 
ployers  when a strike  threatens  to endanger  the economy  or the health  or 
safety  of the public.  For the purposes  of WIPP,  no individual  wage, firm 
wage average,  or wage increase  is too much or too little. WIPP is con- 
cerned  with only the national  average  rate of wage increase. 
One important  difference  between  WIPP and TIP is that the former 
induces  employers  to buy the required  permits  from  other  employers.  The 
gains  from such inducement  are then clearly  seen to be made at the ex- 
pense of other workers  whose employers  sell these same permits. 
This is the elementary  lesson that the economics  profession  has failed 
to teach effectively.  WIPP permits could prevent the pressure  groups 
from recruiting  the support  of the victims of their extortion.  The other 
workers  whose wage increase  permits  are taken  away  would be reluctant 
to support  the extortion  under the fraudulent  slogans of working  class 
solidarity  or to honor  the picket  lines that are picking  their  own pockets. 
TIP, as modified,  would  simulate  price  by using  the tax as a uniform  in- 
centive  for resisting  the pressure  for wage  increases,  but it would  provide 
no guideline  to indicate  how large  the tax must  be to offset  this pressure 
or to monitor  the changes  in the  pressure. 
This pressure  is nothing  but the impact of inflationary  expectations. 
At present  these seem to be about 9 percent  for average  compensation 
and 6 percent  for average  prices.  If either  TIP or WIPP were adopted, 
these expectations  and the consequent  pressures  would decrease,  and the 
incentives  would have to be reduced.  Legislative  and administrative  ad- 
justment  of the taxes are much  too slow; they would work  like decisions 
required  to change  the price  of IBM in the stock exchange. 
In speaking  of WIPP as "internalizing  the inflation  externality,"  as I 
sometimes  have, I was shortchanging  it. The adjusted  TIP also inter- 
nalizes  it, but  the legislative  nightmare,  which  is diminished  by making  the 
TIP tax uniform,  can be removed  only by WIPP's  correction  of the flaw 
in the market  mechanism. 
"Internalization"  is borrowed  from pollution  theory,  where pollution 
permits  are an improvement  on earlier  antipollution  cries such as "pro- 
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understand  that the government  would  be justified  in fixing  a price  for a 
permit  to pollute  only if a proper  market  could not be established. 
But if a market  were established  (which would require  definition  of a 
previously  undefined,  or inadequately  defined property  right and the 
settlement  of clear ownership), there would no longer be a "pollution 
problem."  There would be merely one more scarce commodity  on the 
market.  The externality  has not merely been internalized  by a charge, 
tax, or permit  and converted  into a cost at a level decided  by an admin- 
istrative  or a legislative  authority.  Something  more has been done. The 
externality  has been made  to reflect  the value of the damage  as indicated 
on the market  by the damaged  party.  The market  mechanism  now serves 
as a guide  to the proper  intensity  of the incentive.  No litigation  is required. 
The market  determines  the correct  price. Clarification  of property  rights 
is the euthanasia  of litigation. 
This completion  of the correction  of the flaw corresponds  to Kalecki's 
general  rationing,  which  prevents  the rich  from  wasting  the necessities  of 
the poor;  it completes  the process  of reestablishing  the market  by making 
the general  ration  points  legally  tradable. 
WIPP thus automatically  adjusts  the price of a wage-increase  permit 
to the level of the current  self-fulfilling  inflationary  expectations.  As it 
offsets  the expectation  of inflation,  it diminishes  the inflationary  wage in- 
crease,  the cost increase,  and the price increase.  This lowering  in actual 
inflation  reduces  expectation  of further  inflation  and thereby  further  de- 
creases  actual  inflationary  wages,  costs, and prices.  The inflation  is auto- 
matically  deflated.  The self-fulfilling  expectational  inflation  becomes  self- 
liquidating. 
Because the power of WIPP lies in the price of the permit,  and that 
price  is equated  in the market  to the pressure  of the inflationaly  expecta- 
tions, and because the inflationary  expectations  rest on the experience 
of actual inflation,  the price of the permit  and the power of WIPP de- 
crease  in parallel  with the inflation.  In making  the inflation  self-liquidat- 
ing,  WIPP  also  makes  itself  automatically  self-liquidating. 
The decline of the WIPP permit  price to zero when the inflationary 
pressure,  the inflation,  and WIPP itself are all liquidated  corresponds 
to the eroding  of the scarcity  and the consequent  disappearance  of the 
general  rationing  permits. 
My support  of TIP rather  than WIPP  was partly  due to the belief that 
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dream  too good  to be true.  But it is indeed  a most conservative  device  that 
is operating  in our economy countless  times each day. It leaves each of 
the large  number  of quantities  of some item unregulated-for free deter- 
mination  by a large  number  of people concerned  with  it-while  the aver- 
age of all these  quantities  remains  fixed.  What  makes  WIPP  seem strange 
is only that  the item  is a new one and  has not been treated  in this familiar 
way  in the  past. 
One  example  of the  familiar  miracle  will suffice.  The  number  of oranges 
per consumer  is freely  chosen  by him  when  he takes  the equilibrium  price 
into consideration.  This price, reached by the market, automatically 
makes  the average  number  of oranges  demanded  per consumer  just equal 
to the average  number  available  per consumer  because  the total number 
demanded  is equal  to the  total  number  supplied. 
For this miracle  to work,  society  had to decide  to make  the ownership 
of oranges  a legal property  right  of individuals.  This undoubtedly  was an 
impious, revolutionary,  and antisocial  idea when first suggested  to the 
head of a tribe  where  individual  rights  were nonexistent. 
The new property  right  that needs to be created  unfortunately  is quite 
different  from an orange.  It is the right  of an employer  to raise  his wage 
bill and thus his average  wage. The property  right comes in units of 
$30; its ownership  is registered  by the possession  of one $1,000 permit. 
Its (uniform) price and its annual  rental  are determined  by supply  and 
demand  in the market  in which  the permits  (rights) are freely  exchanged 
by buyers  and sellers and borrowers  and lenders.  This system  of rights 
could correct  the flaw in the market  mechanism  that has resulted  in the 
present  inflation. 
Recent  Questions  Raised 
I conclude  by touching  briefly  on a number  of questions  about  WIPP 
and  TIP  that  have  been  raised  here  and  elsewhere. 
(1)  The relatively  stable price inflation  of 6 percent  a year that has 
been experienced  in the last few years  has as much  right  to be called an 
equilibrium  state as the Keynesian  unemployment  equilibrium  of stable 
wages. This may seem strange  to those who have learned  from the text- 
book that a rise in price  occurs  only when  there  is excess demand-when 
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on a hidden,  perhaps  unnoticed,  assumption  that stable  prices  had been 
expected.  It is only a special  case of a more general  rule. The more gen- 
eral  rule says that, if there  is excess demand,  the previous  expectation  is 
raised  and  the price  will rise faster  than  had  been expected.  In the special 
case in which the expectation  of increased  price is zero, excess demand 
would cause price to rise faster than zero, and the words "faster  than 
zero"  are  taken  as understood.  After all, rising  seems  to mean  rising  faster 
than  zero. 
If, however,  the expectation  was  not a zero  rise  in price  but a 6 percent 
price  increase,  an excess demand,  which always  makes  prices rise more 
than  expected,  would  now  bring  about  a price  rise of more  than  6 percent. 
When  demand  equals  supply,  with no disappointed  buyers  or sellers,  no 
change  would occur,  but again  there  would  be no change  in the expecta- 
tion-that  is, a confirmation  of previous  expectations  and a continuing  of 
the equilibrium  6 percent  rate of price inflation.  This equilibrium  is the 
vicious  circle  that  TIP and  WIPP  have  to break. 
(2)  WIPP  and TIP share  the strategy  of placing  a price  on the grant- 
ing of wage increases (over and above the actual wage increases) that 
would make inflationary  wage increases  more expensive.  The use of ex- 
pressions  like "penalty"  instead  of price or charge  is responsible  for pro- 
posals of progressive  punishment  for more heinous  "crimes"  in the form 
of more than proportional  charges  for larger  wage increases.  But price 
functions  properly  only if the total paid is proportional  to the amount 
bought,  and  this also applies  to the price  paid  for granting  wage  increases. 
(3) More recent  estimates  have reduced  the rate  of increase  in output 
per worker  from 3 to 2 percent.  I think this is partly  a reflection  of the 
state  of depression  in our stagflation  in which output  declines  in a larger 
proportion  than employment,  so that the figure  would return  to the pre- 
vious 3 percent  or so if TIP or WIPP succeeded  in conquering  the stag- 
flation.  The reduction  may also occur  because  more  resources  are  used to 
produce  benefits  that do not appear  in the measure  of output-such  as 
improvement  of the environment  for which only the costs are shown in 
the  figures  for output  per  worker. 
However,  it will not make  much  difference  whether  the figure  adopted 
is 3 percent,  2 percent,  or 4 percent.  Any one of these will yield a stable 
rate of  inflation between + 1 percent and -1  percent and none of 
the  serious  inflation  or stagflation  problems. 
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crease  norm at the final goal of 3 percent (or 2 percent  or 4 percent), 
it should  be gradually  lowered  from the current  9 percent  to reach the 
final  figure  only after  a number  of years.  One reason  given  for this is that 
a sudden  end to the inflation  would give an unfair advantage  to those 
whose compensation  had recently  been raised  at the inflationary  rate of 
about  9 percent,  compared  to those who had been waiting  a year or two 
for their raise when the imposition  of TIP or WIPP reduced theirs to 
about 3 percent.  But other devices are available  for correcting  such in- 
equities.  To soften  this effect  is much  too expensive.  It would cost only a 
tiny fraction  of this to provide  even the most generous  compensation  to 
those who may have been harmed  by the sudden  and unexpected  end to 
the  inflation. 
More  importantly,  a gradual  reduction  in the rate  of inflation  is bound 
to be obscured  from  time  to time by incidental  increases  and decreases  in 
costs due to changes  in circumstances.  These would hide the effect  of the 
TIP or WIPP  only temporarily,  but could easily  lead to the criticism  that 
the anti-inflation  plan is not working and the program  would be dis- 
mantled  before  it had  finished  the  job. 
(4)  There  can be no real distinction  between  incentives  to employers 
to increase  their  resistance  to wage  increases  and  incentives  to workers  to 
reduce  their  pressure  for wage  increases.  In either  case the incentive  is the 
same  tax on the same transaction.  The remaining  issue in all the TIPs is 
who should  pay the tax and who should  receive the "grant."  This is the 
source  of the litigation  nightmare.  WIPP solves this problem  by its allo- 
cation of the property  rights.  The "tax"  is paid by those who buy the 
permits,  and the "revenue"  is received  by the sellers.  A clear title to the 
property  rights  eliminates  this litigation. 
(5)  Cutting  excise taxes,  or any other  taxes  that  enter  into cost, would 
reduce  the costs and  the price  level, and so would  reductions  of monopo- 
listic  restrictions  or of restrictions  on imports.  Such  measures  do increase 
economic  efficiency,  but they do not touch the core of our inflationary 
process.  They  lower  the level of prices,  but only once. They  do nothing  to 
prevent  the exponential  inflationary  trend from continuing  to rise and 
soon more than make up for the one-time  decline in prices.  Such wind- 
falls could affect  the inflationary  trend  only if there  were a serendipitous 
succession  of them  that  would  flatten  out the actual  average  price  move- 
ment  for a period  long enough  to establish  expectations  of further  stabil- 
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anticipation  of continuing  windfalls,  they could establish  a self-fulfilling 
expectation  of stability-a  zero rate of self-fulfillinig  expectational  infla- 
tion-but  such a happy  concatenation  of windfalls  is not likely to occur. 
(6)  If an efficient  TIP were  developed-one  with  the same  incentives 
(tax or grant  deduction) to hold down wage increases  at all levels, the 
basic  grant  (before  the deductions)  would  have to be equal  to the sum  of 
the  taxes  and  the deductions,  so that  the remaining  part  of the grant  would 
just counterbalance  the deflationary  effect  of the taxes. If the grant  were 
given  only to workers  who received  wage  increases  less than  the norm,  we 
would  have a problem  (as seems  to be implied  in Seidman's  approach-to 
induce  workers  to moderate  their  wage demands  in order  to reduce  the 
penalty,  the deductions  from  the grants).  The amount  of the grants  would 
have to be twice that  of the total deductionis.  Some  way would  have to be 
found to prevent  workers  from doing anything  at all to qualify  for some 
of the grant  or to prevent  themselves  from being disqualified.  Otherwise, 
the grant  would no longer be "lump  sum," that is, independent  of the 
wage increase. 
(7)  It would not be possible  for the govermment  to compete  with  pri- 
vate industry  for permits  to raise  the wages  of their  employees.  The deci- 
sion between  public and private  economic  activity  is a political one and 
cannot  be left to the free market.  However,  the same  principles  are valid 
within  the government  sector. There would therefore  have to be a sep- 
arate set of government  wage increase  permits  that operates  within the 
government  budget.  This would check the inflation  of government  wages 
while permitting  the different  departments  to compete  with one another 
for employees.  It would also yield the same demonstration  that wage in- 
creases  by any  government  component  would  have  to come at the expense 
of wages in the other departments froim which the government wage in- 
crease  permits  must  come. 
To have the same permits  for government  and for private industry 
would  impose  great  pressure  on the government  to expand  the budget  in 
response  to an increased  price  of permits  and  would  result  in a shift  from 
private  industry  with  its limited  budgets  to the goverianment  with its elastic 
budget. 
(8)  WIPP does not induce any shift from employing  high-paid  labor 
to low-paid  labor. I would not consider  it a disadvantage  if it did. As 
long as there  is greater  unemployment  among  low-wage  workers,  such a 
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better). With  full employment  the effect  would be to reduce  income in- 
equalities;  this, too, is socially desirable.  It is not even certain  that effi- 
ciency would be sacrificed  to equity in this case. Higher earnings  are 
largely  not rewards  for investment  in training  but the result  of discrimi- 
natory  opportunities  from one's parents  in education,  money, connec- 
tions,  and  good advice;  or just  plain  luck. 
Nevertheless,  the complaint  is not valid, and any of the benefits  men- 
tioned above should be pursued  directly.  WIPP does not cause such a 
shift because  the permits  are proportional  to the wages, and the charges 
for wage  increases  are proportional  to the wage increases.  Relative  costs 
are  unaffected. 
The complaint  does hold for TIPs with upper or lower limits to the 
range  of wage  increase  subject  to the incentives  or for TIPs with different 
rates  of incentive  tax at different  levels of the firm's  average  wage. 
(9)  WIPP will not add to average  cost to be passed on in additional 
price increases  because  the increase  in cost to those who buy permits  is 
exactly  balanced  by the decrease  in cost to those who sell the permits;  and 
in any balanced TIP  the taxes  that add to cost are kept  equal  to the off- 
setting grants that do the opposite. There remain only the effects of the 
reduction  in the wage increases. 
(10) A frequent  objection  is that  the price  of the permits  would  be too 
high  for practical  purposes.  It is impossible  for the price  to be "too  high." 
It cannot  be higher  than  what  the buyers  are  willing  to pay! 
Astronomical  figures  are obtained  by counting  the capital  value of a 
permanent permit (which would allow wage increases to be paid forever) 
with the assumption  that  the inflationary  pressure  would  last forever.  But 
the WIPP permits are annual permits. 
The permits  could also be used to work in the opposite direction  if 
a self-fulfilling  expectation  of falling average  prices and wages, such as 
that of the 1930s, should ever arise again. An incentive against de- 
creases  in wages  would  then be needed,  together  with a requirement  that 
permits  raise the wage bill less than the 3 percent  required  for price sta- 
bility (and a requirement  for still more  such  permits  for actually  lowering 
the wage  bill). This would  have served  to cure  the self-fulfilling  deflation 
of the 1930s; it could be what was sought  in the pre-New  Deal attempts 
of the National Industrial  Recovery  Act to raise prices, such as "Blue 
Eagle" appeals  to patriotism  and ideology or the 1934 increase  in the 
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(11) Some  concern  has  been  expressed  that  there  would  be speculation 
and hoarding  of permits.  I can see no harm in speculation,  but if it is 
desirable  to prevent  fluctuations  in the price of the permits  to make it 
easier  for firms  to plan,  it would  be possible  for the government  to engage 
in "counterspeculation"-that  is, buying  and selling  permits  and pegging 
their  price.  The problems  here are identical  with those of fixing  the rate 
of foreign  exchange.  (The concept  of counterspeculation  is developed  in 
my books, The Economics of Control, 1944, and  Flation, 1972.) In this 
case, as in the case of foreign  exchanges,  I think  the argument  for a free- 
market  price  is the most convincing  one. 
There  is no "hoarding"  problem.  Any permits  purchased  for specula- 
tive purposes  would  be loaned  out and  would still  perform  their  function. 
The owner  of a permit  can gain nothing  by holding  it unused. 
(12)  There  is also the issue  of compliance.  WIPP  requires  monitoring 
to ensure  that there  is no cheating.  This has been considered  equivalent 
to the problem  of monitoring  compliance  with  the wage and  price  regula- 
tions of the controls  period. However, in that case innumerable  prices 
of different  products  as well as different  wages had to be checked for 
compliance  to see if they were in accordance  with the guidelines,  and all 
the problems  of checking  the quality  of products  and  grades  of labor  were 
encountered.  None of these applies  to WIPP.  There  is only the problem 
of ensuring  that people do not claim  to possess permits  that they do not 
have or provide  false wage statements.  These situations  involve only the 
detection  of fraud.  They do not seem to be different  in kind or volume 
from those that are currently  being handled by the Internal  Revenue 
Service  in connection  with auditing  the income  tax. 
(13)  WIPP does not require  calculations  of average  wage, classified 
or unclassified. 
(14)  It is certain  that WIPP and most forms of TIP would be de- 
nounced  as antilabor  because  they  regulate  wages  and  not prices.  Workers 
might  fear that  holding  down wages  would  not result  in a corresponding 
constraint  on prices  so that real wages could fall. The government  could 
alleviate  such fears by a guarantee  to compensate  all employees  for the 
average  decline in real wages or for wages failing to increase  by a con- 
siderable  amount.  There would be little risk in this for the government. 
If, in fact, real wages  increased  by less than the increase  in productivity, 
enormous  profits  would  have been made on which  the government  could 
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It is most  inadvisable  for the government  to attempt  to win the support 
of the workers  by giving  them an initial  tax rebate  equal to the wage in- 
crease  that is prevented  by TIP or WIPP. It would give the workers  a 
large  increase  in real income. The pay raise, based on anticipated  infla- 
tion, would  be used to buy goods at the disinflated  prices.  It would pre- 
empt a major  part of the benefits  from the possible increase  in output 
generated  by the success  in combating  the depression.  Although  the pay 
raise would be worth paying for the sake of obtaining  future benefits, 
there is the danger that it would establish a precedent  for workers  to 
expect more than the economy  could provide  for them in wages;  more- 
over, it could develop into a permanent  and economically  devastating 
subsidy  to wages  that would entail  heavy taxation  and drastic  reductions 
in government  services  to prevent  demand  inflation. 
(15)  It is frequently  implied  and occasionally  even stated explicitly 
that  workers  must  want  the inflation  or else they would not insist  on pay 
increases  that are responsible  for it. But even if it were conceded  that all 
workers  were good economists  and understood  this, it does not follow 
that they want  the result.  No workers  decide  to attempt  to raise  wages  in 
general.  They decide only to push for the increase  in the wages of their 
particular  group.  The purpose  of TIP and,  indeed,  the primary  purpose  of 
WIPP  is to internalize  the externality  by placing  into the particular  pay 
envelope  the effects  of the wage increase  decision  on the economy as a 
whole. To say that workers  make  individual  demands  because  they want 
the collective  result  is similar  to saying  that, in the case of a fire, people 
who rush to the exit, knowing  that if they individually  rush to the exits 
those exits will block and they will collectively  perish,  must desire that 
result! 